Payments System Board

The Payments System Board’s responsibilities and powers are set out in five separate Acts – the Reserve Bank Act 1959, the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998, the Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998, the Corporations Act 2001 and the Cheques Act 1986.

Role of the Payments System Board

The Reserve Bank Act, as amended, gives the Payments System Board responsibility for determining the RBA’s payments system policy. Section 10B of the Act establishes that the Board must exercise this responsibility in a way that is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia and that will best contribute to:

  • controlling risk in the financial system
  • promoting the efficiency of the payments system
  • promoting competition in the market for payment services, consistent with the overall stability of the financial system.

In addition the Payments System Board must ensure that the RBA exercises its powers under Parts 7.3 and 7.3B of the Corporations Act in a way that in the Payments System Board’s opinion will best contribute to the overall stability of the financial system.

Increasingly, central banks are being given explicit authority for payments system safety and stability, but the Board’s legislative responsibility and powers to promote efficiency and competition in the payments system are unique.

The RBA’s wide-ranging powers in the payments system are set out in the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act. It may:

  • ‘Designate’ a particular payment system as being subject to its regulation. Designation has no other effect; it is simply the first of a number of steps the RBA must take to exercise its powers.
  • Determine rules for participation in that system, including rules on access for new participants. Since access is inextricably linked to efficiency the RBA works closely with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (see below).
  • Set standards for safety and efficiency for that system. These may deal with issues such as technical requirements, procedures, performance benchmarks and pricing.
  • Direct participants in a designated payment system to comply with a standard or access regime.
  • Arbitrate on disputes in that system over matters relating to access, financial safety, competitiveness and systemic risk, if the parties concerned wish.

The Act also gives the RBA extensive powers to gather information from a payment system or from individual participants.

The Payment Systems and Netting Act gives the Board a role in removing two important legal uncertainties in the Australian payments system:

  • Under the so-called ‘zero hour’ rule, a court may date the bankruptcy of an institution from the midnight before the bankruptcy order is made. Such a rule would threaten the irrevocable nature of payments in the RTGS system; the strength of this system is that payments cannot be unwound if a participant were to fail after having made payments earlier in the day. Similar concerns arise in the case of ‘delivery-versus-payment’ arrangements in securities settlement systems.
  • Some payment systems in Australia settle on a multilateral net basis. Rather than routinely paying and receiving gross obligations, members of the system pay and receive the relatively small net amounts owed ‘to the system’. This is convenient and efficient, but carries the risk that in the event of the bankruptcy of one of the parties, its administrator might ‘cherry pick’ and insist that solvent institutions meet their gross obligations to pay it while refusing to honour its obligation to do likewise. Solvent parties would then receive little in return for their payments to the failed institution, putting them under liquidity pressures and threatening their own solvency.

The Act provides the basis for removing these uncertainties. It exempts transactions in approved RTGS systems from a possible ‘zero hour’ ruling and ensures that approved multilateral netting arrangements cannot be set aside. The Act does not specify which particular systems are exempt; instead, as a means of providing flexibility, the RBA has been given the power to approve RTGS systems and multilateral netting arrangements that apply for such approval.

The Cheques Act 1986 was amended in 1998 to provide that cheques that are settled in a recognised settlement system will be deemed dishonoured if the financial institution on which they are drawn is unable to provide the funds. This gives an important protection to institutions at which such cheques are deposited, because it allows them to reverse any provisional credits made on the basis of these cheques. The RBA has been given responsibility under the Cheques Act to determine that a system for settlement of cheques is a recognised settlement system.

The Payments System Board acquired additional responsibilities for the regulation of securities clearing and settlement facilities with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in August 2001. The passage of the Treasury Laws Amendment (Financial Market Infrastructure and Other Measures) Act 2024 extended these regulatory responsibilities and provided the RBA with new powers for supervision and crisis resolution at clearing and settlement facilities.

Meetings of the Payments System Board

The Payments System Board meets once per quarter. A media release is issued after each meeting, setting out the key issues considered by the Board at that meeting.

Five members form a quorum for a meeting of the Payments System Board, which must be chaired by the Governor or, in their absence, the Deputy Chair, who is a representative of the RBA. The Act provides for decisions to be reached by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting, with the Chair having a casting vote, if necessary, in addition to a deliberative vote. Meetings are held at the RBA’s Head Office in Sydney. They commence at 9.00 am and generally run for around three and half hours, and usually conclude with a light lunch to which a guest is invited.

Members of the Payments System Board

The membership of the Payments System Board is specified in section 25A of the Reserve Bank Act:

  • the Governor of the RBA (Chair of the Payments System Board)
  • one representative of the RBA who is appointed by the Governor and who must be either a member of one of the RBA’s other boards or a member of the RBA service (Deputy Chair of the Payments System Board)
  • one representative of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) who is appointed by APRA and who must be either an APRA member or an APRA staff member
  • up to five other members who are appointed by the Treasurer for a term of up to five years.

The current members of the Payments System Board are:

Photograph of Michele Bullock

Chair: Michele Bullock

BEc (Hons) (UNE), MSc (LSE)

Governor since 18 September 2023
Present term ends 17 September 2030

Chair – Monetary Policy Board
Chair – Governance Board
Chair – Council of Financial Regulators
Chair – Financial Markets Foundation for Children
Member – Financial Stability Board
Member – Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision
Director – The Anika Foundation

Photograph of Brad Jones

Deputy Chair: Brad Jones

PhD (Macquarie)

Assistant Governor (Financial System)
Deputy Chair since 16 January 2024

Member – Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Member – Council of Financial Regulators
Member – Institute of Global Finance Advisory Board
Member – Financial Stability Board Standing Committee on Assessment of Vulnerabilities
Chair – Financial Market Infrastructure Review Committee

Photograph of Ross Buckley

Non-executive Member: Ross Buckley

BEcon, LLB (Hons) (UQ), PhD (UNSW), LLD (Melbourne)

Member since 1 August 2023
Present term ends 31 July 2028

Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow & Scientia Professor of Law – The University of New South Wales
Chair – Digital Finance Advisory Panel, Australian Securities & Investments Commission
Member – Consultative Panel, Australian Securities & Investments Commission
Strategic Research Advisor – Digital Finance Cooperative Research Centre
Fellow and Academic Member – European Banking Institute, Frankfurt

Photograph of Gina Cass-Gottlieb

Non-executive Member: Gina Cass-Gottlieb

BEc (Hons), LLB (Hons) (Sydney), LLM (Berkeley)

Member from 15 July 2013 to 14 July 2018
Reappointed from 1 August 2018
Present term ends 31 July 2028

Chair – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Photograph of Michelle Deaker

Non-executive Member: Michelle Deaker

BSc (Hons) (Sydney), MSc (Sydney), PhD (UC)

Member since 1 August 2023
Present term ends 31 July 2028

Founding Partner & Managing Director – One Ventures
Director – Phocas Group
Director – Buildkite
Director – WinVC Limited
Board Observer – Employment Hero

Photograph of Scott Farrell

Non-executive Member: Scott Farrell

BEc (Sydney), LLB (Hons) (Sydney), PhD (UNSW)

Member since 23 March 2022
Present term ends 22 March 2027

Strategic Counsel – King & Wood Mallesons
Adjunct Professor – School of Private and Commercial Law, University of New South Wales
Chair – International Standards Organisation TC 307 Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies

Photograph of John Lonsdale

Non-executive Member: John Lonsdale

Chair – Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
Member since 1 November 2022

Member – Council of Financial Regulators
Member – Financial Stability Board Standing Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation
Member – Trans-Tasman Council on Banking Supervision

Photograph of Deborah Ralston

Non-executive Member: Deborah Ralston

BEc, Dip Fin Mgt, MEc (UNE), PhD (Bond)

Member since 15 December 2016
Present term ends 14 December 2026

Professorial Fellow – Monash University
Chair – Advisory Board, Household Capital
Director – SMSF Association
Member – Advisory Board, Connexus Institute
Member – Future Fund Board of Guardians

Relationship with the RBA’s other boards and with the Australian Government

The Reserve Bank Act provides a clear delineation between the Payments System Board, which has responsibility for the RBA’s payments system policy, and both the Monetary Policy Board (which has responsibility for the RBA’s monetary policy and its policy for financial stability, other than when that relates to payments system policy) and the Governance Board (which has responsibility for the RBA’s policy on all other matters). Instances of conflict over policies should therefore be rare. The RBA’s three boards are working towards establishing a memorandum of understanding to clarify how they will work together effectively and manage any potential conflicts that may arise. However, if a conflict were to arise, the Governor has the ultimate authority to resolve the conflict.

The Payments System Board is required to inform the Government of its policies. In the event of a difference of opinion between the Government and the Board, the provisions of the Reserve Bank Act provide a mechanism for dispute resolution.

Relationship with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)

The ACCC has a longstanding role in the Australian payments system. Payment systems often rely on cooperative arrangements between participants that are otherwise competitors; such arrangements therefore have the potential to contravene the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (formerly the Trade Practices Act 1974). However, if the ACCC judges the arrangements as being, on balance, in the public interest, it may authorise them. The ACCC has authorised a number of such arrangements, particularly those operated by the Australian Payments Network for cheque-clearing, direct entry, debit cards and high-value transactions. With the enactment of the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998, there is an onus on the RBA and the ACCC to take a consistent approach to policies on access and competition in the payments system. This has been facilitated through an ACCC and RBA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was originally signed in 1998 and most recently updated in June 2024. The MOU makes it clear that:

  • The ACCC is responsible for ensuring that payments system arrangements comply with the competition and access provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act, in the absence of any specific RBA initiatives. Under its adjudication role, the ACCC may grant immunity from court action for certain anti-competitive practices, if it is satisfied that such practices are in the public interest. It may also accept undertakings in respect of third-party access to essential facilities.
  • If the RBA, after appropriate consultation, uses its powers to impose an access regime and/or set standards for a particular payment system, participants in that system will not be at risk under the Competition and Consumer Act by complying with the RBA’s requirements.

The effect is that the ACCC retains responsibility for competition and access in a payment system, unless the RBA designates that system and follows up by imposing an access regime and/or setting standards for it. If the RBA does so, its requirements are paramount. Designation does not, by itself, remove a system from the ACCC’s coverage.

In terms of the MOU, RBA and ACCC staff are in close contact on relevant matters. The Governor and the Chair of the ACCC also meet at least once a year to discuss issues of mutual interest in the payments system.

Regulator Performance

As noted in the Reserve Bank of Australia Corporate Plan, the RBA’s longstanding approach is to work with industry participants to achieve outcomes that are in the public interest, with regulatory activity contemplated only when an appropriate industry response is not forthcoming. The RBA will implement the regulatory framework for payment systems and FMIs consistent with the Australian Government’s Regulator Performance Guide. In particular, the RBA will actively engage with stakeholders and conduct research to understand emerging issues affecting the environment in which regulated entities operate. The RBA will ensure regulatory requirements are streamlined, proportionate to risks and coordinated with other regulators, and build capability in data analysis to efficiently monitor compliance. The RBA will also communicate with regulated entities in a timely, clear and consistent way, including on its regulatory priorities.

The Australian Government’s Regulator Performance Guide took effect from 1 July 2021 and replaced the 2014 Regulator Performance Framework. In line with the new arrangements, for 2021–2022 onwards, the RBA will incorporate a summary of its performance against the principles of regulator best practice in the Guide as part of the Annual Performance Statement published in the Reserve Bank of Australia Annual Report.

See Regulator Performance Framework for information about the RBA’s annual assessments under the earlier framework.