Assessment of ASX Clearing and Settlement Facilities – September 2024 Appendix A: Summary of Progress 2023/24

The tables below summarise actions taken by the ASX CS facilities during the 12 months to June 2024 (the assessment period) to address recommendations identified in the RBA’s 2023 Assessment of ASX Clearing and Settlement Facilities, as well as outstanding recommendations from previous years. Table 3 summarises all open recommendations as of 30 June 2024, including a summary of progress against outstanding recommendations from previous years. Table 4 provides a summary of recommendations that have been closed or superseded during the assessment period. Table 5 provides a summary of work progressed in the 2023 areas of supervisory focus.

Table 3: Summary of All Open Recommendations at 30 June 2024
Reference* Recommendation Standard Facility Update Timeframe
2022-8 Legal basis: PSNA. ASX Settlement should apply for approvals as an approved RTGS system and as a multilateral netting arrangement under the Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 (PSNA), or in the case of the multilateral netting approval provide the RBA with legal analysis demonstrating why its existing approval remains valid once changes to the ASX Settlement operating rules required to support the introduction of the CHESS replacement have been made. CCP/SSF 1 ASX Settlement This recommendation is linked to work on the CHESS Replacement. Progress is to be reviewed once the work on the second release of the CHESS Replacement Program (settlement and sub-register replacement) has progressed.
2023-4 Governance: Stakeholder engagement. The ASX boards should continue their emphasis on stakeholder management. ASX should continue to actively consult stakeholders on the detailed design, project timeline, testing and implementation for the CHESS replacement and ClearStar. CCP/SSF 2 All

Recommendation updated and extended to include ClearStar. Timeframe updated.

ASX has engaged with stakeholders on the solution design, project and implementation timeline through the industry Business Committee, Technical Committee, and related working groups. ASX also supported the Advisory Group that was instigated by ASIC. ASX disclosed its analysis of transition options. ASX has consulted with stakeholders on the first release of CHESS Replacement (clearing), as well as the possible shortening of settlement cycles to T+1. A consultation on the second release of CHESS Replacement (settlement and sub-registry) was published in August 2024.

December 2029
2021-18 Framework for the comprehensive management of risks: Risks to and from other entities. ASX should establish a process to periodically conduct systematic assessments of the range of potential risks other entities may pose to its CS facilities and the risks ASX CS facilities could potentially pose to other entities. CCP/SSF 3 All ASX has completed its initial assessment to profile risks posed to and from other entities. The profiles are expected to be finalised by end 2024. 31 December 2024
2024-1 Framework for the comprehensive management of risks: Risk culture. In the 2025 assessment period, ASX should continue implementing its plan to improve risk culture. ASX should also implement the recommendations of the external review of this plan, which include defining a target state and ensuring consistent risk communication and leadership. CCP/SSF 3 All New Recommendation. 30 June 2025
2024-2 Framework for the comprehensive management of risks: Methodology of return to risk appetite strategy. By 30 June 2025, ASX should obtain an independent review (conducted by either its Internal Audit or an external expert) of its strategy to address its heightened level of risk. This should include consideration of its KRIs. The review should also consider whether its strategy is responsive to evolving risks. CCP/SSF 3 All New Recommendation. 30 June 2025
2023-9 Credit risk: Specific wrong way risk. ASX should introduce additional stress test scenarios to monitor and mitigate specific wrong way risks at ASX Clear by 31 December 2024. CCP 4 ASX Clear During the assessment period, ASX developed a proposal to stress test additional scenarios to monitor and mitigate specific wrong way risks at ASX Clear. ASX expects to finalise and implement the scenarios in the following assessment period, taking into account participant feedback. 31 December 2024
2023-10 Credit risk: Outstanding margin in stress tests. ASX should account for outstanding margin payments in its stress test calculations. CCP 4 Both CCPs

Recommendation updated. Timeframe updated.

During the assessment period, ASX presented a plan and timeline to account for outstanding margin payments in its stress test calculations. ASX currently expects to implement the required changes prior to September 2025.

30 September 2025
2018-1a CCP Resilience Guidance. The ASX CCPs should enhance the comprehensiveness of stress testing to ensure risks are appropriately identified, captured and stressed. CCP 4, 7 Both CCPs

During the assessment period, ASX commenced model development on a new liquidity stress testing model for both CCPs. ASX also increased the comprehensiveness of stress testing scenarios.

Over the next two assessment periods, ASX intends to introduce collateral stress testing at ASX Clear (Futures) and implement its new liquidity stress testing model at both CCPs.

Expected completion by June 2026
2023-12 Margin: Overnight variation margin. ASX Clear (Futures) should develop a long-term strategy for its overnight margin operations by December 2024. CCP 6 ASX Clear (Futures) ASX is in the process developing a long-term strategy for overnight margin processes. Strategy by 31 December 2024
2023-13 Margin: ASX Clear intraday margin. ASX Clear should enhance its capacity to monitor the build-up of current exposures to participants and to make intraday margin calls to participants. CCP 6 ASX Clear

Recommendation updated. At the end of the assessment period, ASX delivered a plan to enhance its technological capability to monitor the build-up of current exposures to participants and to make intraday margin calls.

The RBA will discuss the plan with ASX in the coming assessment period.

Indicative timing is prior to June 2029
2020-1 Margin. Consistent with the CCP Resilience Guidance, by 31 December 2024, the ASX CCPs should develop a systematic framework to avoid destabilising increases in margin and other financial risk requirements during periods of heightened market volatility. This framework should include an appropriate methodology for measuring the degree of procyclicality in the CCPs’ risk models and should consider the potential effect of expert judgement on procyclicality when determining margin and other financial risk requirements. CCP 6 Both CCPs

Recommendation updated. Timeframe updated. During the assessment period, ASX completed the implementation of margin floors for all products. ASX also implemented a margin forward guidance framework and developed a methodology for measuring procyclicality.

ASX is still finalising updates to its procyclicality framework. ASX requested an extension to this recommendation to ensure their proposed framework is consistent with potential new international regulatory guidance. The RBA will review this framework and monitor whether it has been embedded over the following assessment period.

31 December 2024
2024-3 Segregation and Portability: By 30 June 2025, ASX should benchmark its portability arrangements against international best practice and share the results with the RBA. Following this exercise, ASX should determine whether there are additional steps it should take to improve the likelihood of porting in a default management situation. ASX should also incorporate client porting into its default management fire drills. CCP 13 Both CCPs New recommendation. Benchmarking by 30 June 2025
2023-15 Operational risk: Evergreen strategy. ASX should develop and begin implementing a long-term strategy to proactively identify ageing assets and remediate the risks before they materialise. CCP 16
SSF 14
All

Timeframe updated.

In May 2024, ASX presented the RBA with its Long-Term Technology Sustainability Strategy. Over the 2025 assessment period the RBA will monitor and assess whether this strategy proves to be fit for purpose.

30 June 2025
2024-4 Operational risk: Aged asset reporting. Throughout the 2025 assessment period, ASX should continue to place high priority on remediating ageing technology assets and ensure that major technology remediation activities progress to scheduled timelines. As part of this, ASX should continue to assess whether its short-term controls remain sufficient and appropriate. ASX should also ensure it has sufficient resources and capabilities to support the health of critical systems and remediation activities. ASX should provide regular reporting to the boards that clearly shows:
  • progress against its Technology Issues Remediation Roadmap
  • a holistic view of the health of all critical systems, and the expected impact of planned remediation activities on the risk attributes of critical systems.
CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 30 June 2025
2024-5 Operational risk: Asset-lifecycle management framework. By 30 June 2025, ASX should ensure that it has an appropriate framework or policy for asset lifecycle management that mandates the proactive upgrade or replacement of technology assets before they reach end-of-life. As part of this, ASX should explicitly outline responsibilities around asset lifecycle management and ensure that the tools used to track technology assets are fit for purpose. CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 30 June 2025
2024-6 Operational risk: Implement PPPM recommendations. By 30 June 2026, ASX should complete and sustainably implement the recommendations from the PPPM Reports. ASX should prioritise those regarding:
  • the useability of the PPPM framework documents
  • project resource forecasting, forecasting capacity/demand planning and portfolio management functions
  • clarifying roles and decision-making responsibilities
  • stage-gate reviews.
CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 30 June 2026
2024-7 Operational risk: Simplify vendor management risk policies. By 28 February 2025, ASX should simplify and streamline its frameworks and policies relating to the management of vendor risks. The frameworks and policies should ensure that requirements and responsibilities are clear, unambiguous and consistent. CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 28 February 2025
2024-8 Operational risk: Mandating vendor management practices. By 28 February 2025, the following should be made clearly mandatory for all key vendors supporting the CS facilities:
  • vendor risk assessments
  • implementation of consistent enterprise processes for monitoring vendor performance
  • contingency plans for when a vendor ceases to provide services.
CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 28 February 2025
2024-9 Operational risk: Uplift vendor management capabilities. By 30 June 2025, ASX should improve its organisation-wide capabilities for vendor management. ASX should identify the skills and training required for staff with vendor management responsibilities and develop a plan for putting these skills and training in place. CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 30 June 2025
2024-10 Operational risk: Fourth party vendor management risks. By 31 December 2026, ASX should have developed and implemented formal frameworks to monitor and manage fourth-party and concentration risks for vendors servicing the CS facilities. This should include identification of fourth-party single points of failure. CCP 16
SSF 14
All New recommendation. 31 December 2026
2020-8 Operational risk: Risk management systems. The ASX CCPs should implement plans to ensure that their core systems have the functionality to fully support their risk management approach, including by migrating processes currently operated on non-core systems to core systems. CCP 16 Both CCPs ASX intends this work to be included in the scope of the ClearStar program, which has extended the timeline for completion. Expected completion by June 2029
2023-17 Operational risk: CHESS – Independent review recommendations. ASX should implement the 45 recommendations from the independent review of CHESS replacement, conducted by Accenture. ASX should also ensure that any relevant steps are taken to apply lessons learnt from the external review more holistically across the enterprise. CCP 16
SSF14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Timeframe updated.

ASX has completed and closed 89 of the 93 actions planned to address the Accenture recommendations. External reviews have been undertaken to verify the sustainable implementation of the actions. Two of the remaining actions are expected to be completed as part of the CHESS Replacement project. The other two remaining actions require further evidence of implementation before they can be closed.

31 December 2029
2023-21 Operational risk: CHESS – Upgrades to comply with the FSS. ASX should identify any upgrades that are required for CHESS to comply with the FSS and communicate its plans to consult stakeholders and implement these changes in a safe and timely way. ASX is to consult stakeholders in relation to any material changes to the current CHESS and publish key details and timelines for all upgrades to CHESS. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Timeframe updated.

ASX has progressed items on the current CHESS Roadmap and planned further upgrades as part of the updated Roadmap. This work will be ongoing until the current CHESS is replaced.

31 December 2029
2023-24 Operational risk: CHESS – Backup plan. ASX should clearly communicate to regulators what their backup plan will be in the event that the replacement system is not delivered before supportability of the current CHESS is severely compromised. The risks around the backup plan should be appropriately identified, assessed and monitored, with appropriate controls put in place to mitigate these risks. This communication to the regulators on the backup plan should be at the same time as communication on the solution selection decision. ASX should also clearly communicate to stakeholders what their backup plan will be if the selected CHESS replacement solution is unable to be implemented. This communication to stakeholders should be well in advance of the current CHESS being severely compromised to ensure stakeholders have sufficient and appropriate notice to test and implement the backup plan in a safe manner. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Timeframe updated.

ASX presented the regulators their backup plan in the event that CHESS Replacement does not occur before the supportability of CHESS is severely compromised. ASX plans to review the backup plan as part of a refreshed CHESS business case in November. At this time, the RBA expects the plan to include more detail on how the risks of enacting the backup option will be managed appropriately.

30 November 2024
2023-26 Operational risk: CHESS – Implementation timeline. ASX should publish on its website its project and implementation timeline with dates for key milestones. This plan should have a new and credible go-live date for CHESS replacement. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Timeframe updated.

ASX published indicative go-live dates in November 2023, noting these would be subject to stakeholder consultation and more detailed planning.

In June 2024, ASX completed industry consultation on the first release of CHESS Replacement and published a project and implementation timeline with key milestones for this release. The expected go-live date for the first release is the first half of 2026.

The second release of CHESS Replacement is estimated to go live in 2029. Stakeholder consultation on this release commenced in August. The implementation dates and milestones will be confirmed by November 2024.

30 November 2024
2020-5 Operational risk: CHESS – Capacity and system replacement. ASX should implement the new clearing and settlement system for cash market transactions as soon as this can be safely achieved by ASX and users of CHESS. In the short term, ASX should complete work underway to increase the joint capacity of the current CHESS and CORE systems. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

ASX announced a phased implementation of CHESS Replacement. The first release (proposed for the first half of 2026) is expected to address the capacity issues in the current trade registration process in CHESS.

Changes to address the dependency of current CHESS on CORE were completed in July and August 2024.

ASX completed stress tests of the current CHESS and implemented a fix for a breakpoint identified at a peak of 15 million trades per day. ASX is analysing and monitoring the feasibility of further options for improving CHESS capacity over the next year.

2020-6 Operational risk: CHESS – IBM Review. ASX should ensure that the findings and lessons learned from the IBM Review of the Trade Refresh project are applied to the CHESS Replacement Program. CCP 16
SSF 14
All

Recommendation updated.

ASX has now implemented all 59 IBM Review recommendations. An independent expert (EY) has confirmed all recommendations are fully closed. EY has been engaged to perform spot checks to assess the continued adherence to these recommendations, the first tranche of these spot checks was completed in March 2024.

Lessons learned from the IBM Review have been built into the CHESS Replacement project with the remaining action items having defined milestones linked to the progress of the CHESS Replacement. ASX’s internal CHESS Replacement Assurance plan will track these actions to closure.

31 January 2026
2022-6 Operational risk: CHESS – CHESS replacement go-live. ASX should prepare for cutover, migration and go-live of the CHESS replacement system, including by:
  • having comprehensive and effective contingency plans in place for dealing with an issue on the go-live weekend or subsequent to go-live
  • successful execution of migration dress rehearsals
  • effective arrangements for go-live decision-making, including ASX’s compliance with relevant 2021 License Conditions.
CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

CHESS Replacement will be implemented in two releases. The first release (clearing) is expected to go live in the first half of 2026, and the second (settlement and sub-registry) in 2029.

ASX has designed an assurance program to assist with risk management and decision-making at key milestones. ASX expects to develop and publish its cutover approach for the first release in the next assessment period.

2024-11 Tiered Participation Arrangements: Tiered participation policies. By 30 June 2025, ASX should develop a formal policy to identify, monitor and manage risks that arise from tiered participation arrangements for all its facilities. In developing this policy, ASX should consider whether there are additional actions that can be taken to enhance the monitoring and management of the risks that can arise from these arrangements. CCP 18
SSF 16
All New recommendation. 30 June 2025

* Referencing indicates the year the recommendation was first raised and the order in which the recommendation appears in this table. Recommendations have been grouped by standard and topic.

Table 4: Previous Recommendations Closed or Superseded
Reference* Previous Recommendation Standard Facility Progress and outcome
2021-1 Governance: CS facility strategies. The objectives, strategies and goals for each CS facility should be documented and communicated within the ASX group. The objectives should explicitly place a high priority on the safety of the facility and explicitly support the stability of the financial system and other relevant public interest considerations. This should include a statement as to how ‘financial stability’ can be practically understood by decision-makers within the CS facilities. It should also set out the strategies that have been adopted to safeguard system stability. CS board processes should include a system for monitoring progress against the strategy and objectives. CCP/SSF 2 All The 2023/24 CS strategies were updated in October 2023, and the 2024/25 strategies in June 2024. Progress against the strategies was reported to the boards periodically by the CS Lead Executives. The target outcomes in the CS strategies are incorporated into annual divisional planning and employee performance goals. ASX has also introduced guidance and training for key decision-makers (including CS board members, executives and some line-one risk groups) on key factors that can impact financial stability.
2021-15 Governance: Stakeholder management. The ASX boards should continue their emphasis on stakeholder management, potentially through the creation of a stakeholder committee. This should also include more regular meetings with key stakeholders. CCP/SSF 2 ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed and combined with 2023-4.

ASX has supported the functioning of the Advisory Group for strategic matters relating to cash equities clearing and settlement, which was established at the initiation of ASIC. ASX has also engaged with stakeholders on CHESS Replacement through the industry Business Committee, Technical Committee and associated working groups, and consultations on the first release of CHESS Replacement and transition to T+1.

ASX also has a high-level plan for stakeholder engagement on ClearStar.

ASX needs to continue placing a high emphasis on stakeholder management for CHESS Replacement and ClearStar (see recommendation 2023-4).

2023-1 Governance: Board oversight. ASX should redouble its efforts to ensure that key issues are appropriately raised with the ASX boards. By 31 March 2024, ASX should undertake a review of its board agendas, papers and minutes to ensure they enable the boards to debate and provide direction on the key issues raised in this Assessment. CCP/SSF2 All

Outcome: Closed and replaced with an ‘Area of Supervisory Focus’.

An external review found ASX’s board oversight arrangements to be appropriate, but recommended improvements to board reporting. A new reporting template was introduced late in the assessment period. The quality of reporting to the boards will remain an area of focus during the next assessment period.

2023-2 Governance: Self-assessment. The CS boards should continue to require the CS Lead Executives to complete a self-assessment of compliance with the FSS on an annual basis. CCP/SSF 2 All

Outcome: Closed.

ASX completed a self-assessment for the calendar year ending 2023, and has a process in place to complete annual self-assessments going forward.

2023-3 Governance: Accountability framework. ASX should further strengthen and clarify lines of responsibility and accountability within its CS facilities. It should ensure that its accountability documents:
  • are clear and specific, with no gaps or unintended overlaps in accountabilities
  • articulate desired outcomes and hold executives to high standards.

ASX should complete planned testing of the accountability documents against a set of hypothetical outcome scenarios to validate their effectiveness.
CCP/SSF2 All

Outcome: Closed.

ASX updated its executive accountability statements to more clearly articulate expected actions and executives’ roles in the implementation of key risk management and operating frameworks. The statements work together with a new program to ensure the appropriate maturity of key frameworks (see section 3.2.2) and remuneration arrangements, to hold executives to account for the quality of outcomes.

ASX also introduced scenario testing to identify and remediate any gaps or overlaps in accountabilities.

2023-5

Governance: CHESS – Accountability statements. By 31 December 2023, ASX should ensure that responsibilities under the CHESS Roadmap are included in ASX accountability documentation.

CCP/SSF 2 ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

Accountability statements were updated through the year to include accountabilities, in line with the published CHESS governance statement.

2023-6 Governance: CHESS – Governance arrangements. ASX should publish its governance arrangements in relation to the current CHESS and the CHESS Replacement Program by 31 October 2023. CCP/SSF 2 ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

ASX published a statement outlining its governance arrangements for the current CHESS and CHESS Replacement on its website 30 October 2023. Updates to the governance arrangements were published in May 2024.

2023-7 Internal audit. ASX should complete its response to the recommendations made in the external review of its Internal Audit function. As part of the response, the ASX executive team and new GM IA should identify the cultural changes required to remediate the relationship between Internal Audit and the executive, while ensuring that Internal Audit remains an independent source of challenge. A plan to implement any required changes should be completed by 31 December 2023. The ASX boards and CEO must place a high priority on ensuring that the Internal Audit function is effective and appropriately supported. ASX should commission a follow-up external review by June 2024 to reassess line 3 effectiveness. CCP/SSF 2, 3 All

Outcome: Closed.

ASX expanded and actioned a plan for responding to the findings made in the external review of its Internal Audit function. A follow-up external review in June 2024 concluded that ASX’s response to all high and medium findings had been completed or satisfactorily progressed.

ASX also identified and took steps to remediate the relationship between Internal Audit and the Executive. This included increased engagement and greater transparency by Internal Audit, as well as introducing accountabilities relating to Internal Audit in Executives’ accountability statements. Internal Audit followed the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Global Audit Standard to maintain independence. Audits conducted during the year have demonstrated independent challenge from Internal Audit, and constructive response to the findings by executives. The follow-up external review noted a step-change in engagement between Internal Audit and the Executive.

2018-1d CCP Resilience Guidance. The ASX CCPs should ensure that roles and processes in relation to the governance of financial risk management are appropriately formalised and documented in order to ensure that the CS boards have sufficient information to effectively oversee the CCPs. CCP 2, 4, 6, 7 Both CCPs

Outcome: Closed.

During the assessment period, ASX implemented its revised Model Risk Policy, outlining ASX’s approach to the management of models and tools used within the ASX CCPs. The policy also outlines rules and responsibilities of the CS Board, and other relevant staff in relation to Model Risk management.

2018-1e CCP Resilience Guidance. The ASX CCPs should ensure that their arrangements for disclosure to, and soliciting feedback from, stakeholders cover all relevant aspects of the CCPs’ risk management frameworks, including margin sensitivity analysis, reverse stress testing and management of procyclicality. CCP 2, 4, 6, 7 Both CCPs

Outcome: Closed.

During the assessment period, ASX implemented a formal policy to govern the CCPs’ risk disclosures to its stakeholders, covering all relevant aspects of CCP risk management.

2020-7 Operational risk: Management. The ASX CS facilities should continue to embed the use of new systems and processes supporting change management, incident management and knowledge management, and use these systems to identify, monitor and manage operational risks at an enterprise-wide level. ASX Internal Audit should complete its review of the effectiveness of these systems and processes in practice. CCP 16
SSF 14
All

Outcome: Closed.

All systems and processes required by the recommendation have been implemented. ASX has completed its review of the effectiveness of all systems and controls.

2023-14 Operational risk: Ageing asset roadmap. By 31 December 2023, ASX should develop a comprehensive roadmap for the remediation of currently identified ageing assets. This roadmap should:
  1. include timelines and dependencies for remediation (e.g. key milestones such as business case and funding approval)
  2. clearly specify the prioritisation of system remediation
  3. include details of the key risks for assets that will reach the end of their support period or end-of-life before remediation or replacement
  4. include the implementation of short-term controls to mitigate these risks.

The roadmap should be approved by the ASX boards, and regular progress updates should be provided to the boards.
CCP 16
SSF 14
All

Outcome: Closed.

During the assessment period, ASX introduced the Technology Issues Remediation Roadmap. This roadmap currently tracks the remediation of High Severity Technology Issues at ASX. The roadmap will now be reported to the ASX Board on a quarterly basis. At least annually, the roadmap will be reviewed with any new issues added.

2023-16 Operational risk: Vendor management. ASX’s vendor management policy should be consistently applied for all vendor arrangements supporting the CS facilities. The outsourcing policy should be completed and applied to all outsourcing arrangements for the CS facilities. CCP 16
SSF 14
All

Outcome: Closed.

ASX prepared a new policy for key vendors – the Critical Third-Party Policy – in late December 2023, which took effect on 1 January 2024. ASX also prepared an associated handbook to guide internal users on the application of the policy. The Vendor Management Framework was updated to reflect the introduction of the policy. Through the second half of the assessment period, ASX applied the new policy to relevant contracts, though work to embed the policy requirements is ongoing. Several new related recommendations have been opened as part of the special topic on Operational Risk.

2023-8 Credit risk: Historical scenario exclusion. ASX CS boards should review the exclusion of the historical scenarios by March 2024 and ASX management should put procedures in place to ensure proper governance processes are followed for future decisions. CCP 4 Both CCPs

Outcome: Closed.

During the assessment period, ASX introduced a Historical Stress Scenario Governance Policy and implemented new processes to regularly monitor and review market moves exceeding existing stress test scenarios. ASX’s Clearing and Settlement Boards formally approved the exclusion of the March 2020 10-year bond futures intraday ‘flash crash’.

2023-11 Clearing risk policy reviews. ASX should complete all overdue key clearing risk reviews set out in the policies and standards that are rated as high and medium materiality by 30 June 2024. CCP 4, 6, 7 Both CCPs

Outcome: Closed.

ASX completed all overdue clearing risk reviews set out in the policies and standards that are rated as high and medium materiality.

2022-2 Margin. ASX should develop and implement a plan to review its margin methodologies and systems that takes into consideration international best practice and is designed to produce coherent and consistent risk outcomes from its margin models that are transparent to participants. ASX should discuss its implementation plan with the RBA by 30 September 2023. CCP 6 Both CCPs

Outcome: Closed.

ASX completed its review of its margin methodologies and systems in October 2023. Following on from the review, ASX is currently planning to develop an enterprise-wide value-at-risk-based margin model for all products cleared by ASX.

2023-18 Operational risk: CHESS – The CHESS Roadmap. ASX should:
  1. by 30 June 2024, implement a robust annual process of updating the CHESS Roadmap to ensure that all planned upgrades and material changes to the current CHESS are incorporated
  2. provide ASX boards and the regulators with ongoing visibility of the CHESS Roadmap, relevant risks, new deliverables and measures to ensure continued compliance with the FSS
  3. share the latest CHESS Roadmap with the industry at least on an annual basis
  4. progress and safely implement currently identified and any new deliverables, including required upgrades.
CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

ASX has progressed deliverables on the CHESS Roadmap and provided the required visibility to the ASX boards and regulators.

ASX has established a process for updating and communicating the CHESS Roadmap on an annual basis. An updated roadmap, as well as an external assurance report over the roadmap, was published in July 2024.

2023-19 Operational risk: CHESS – Capacity bottlenecks. By 31 January 2024, ASX should provide the regulators with details of the capacity bottlenecks identified during breakpoint stress tests. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

ASX provided the regulators with a report on the capacity bottlenecks identified during breakpoint stress tests. The bottlenecks identified are the trade registration and end-of-day processing services. Bottlenecks were not identified in the batch settlement process.

2023-20 Operational risk: CHESS – Capacity test. By 30 June 2024, subject to the results of the breakpoint stress tests, ASX should test the effect on performance if daily trading volumes go up to 15 million (above 100 per cent headroom to the historic peak of 7 million), identify key bottlenecks, and communicate those to the ASX boards and the regulators. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

ASX tested the effect on performance at daily peak volumes of 12.5 million and 15 million trades. The results were communicated to the ASX boards and the regulators.

2023-22 Operational risk: CHESS – Audit of the special report. By 31 December 2023, ASX should provide the RBA and ASIC with details of its progress on meeting the recommendations in the Audit Report. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

ASX has provided progress updates through regular reporting on the current CHESS.

2023-23 Operational risk: CHESS – Transition option. ASX should assess the risks and benefits of various transition options during the solution redesign phase and choose a transition option that appropriately manages the transition risks. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

ASX analysed the risks associated with three transition options for CHESS replacement and selected what it assessed to be the lowest risk option. The option selected was a phased implementation approach. The first phase will replace clearing functionality and the second, settlement and sub-registry functionality. ASX considered the approach would increase trade registration capacity at the earliest possible point without the requirement for modifications to current CHESS. It was also assessed by ASX to have the least industry impact.

2023-25 Operational risk: CHESS – Vendor access. ASX should provide the regulators with full and unfettered access to their new delivery partners for the CHESS Replacement Program and contractually require their delivery partners to cooperate with the regulators. CCP 16
SSF 14
ASX Clear
ASX Settlement

Outcome: Closed.

Contractual arrangements with the CHESS replacement vendors include provisions that provide the regulators with rights of access to the vendors. This includes the ability to interview vendor staff, inspect premises and inspect records.

2023-27 Regulatory reporting. ASX should complete its FMI Data Reporting project by 31 December 2023. CCP 21
SSF 19
All

Outcome: Closed.

ASX completed the final stages of its FMI Data Reporting project.

* Referencing indicates year the recommendation was first raised and the order in which the recommendation appears in Table 3.

Table 5: Summary of Progress Against 2023 Areas of Supervisory Focus
Development Standard Facility Actions
Areas of supervisory focus
Risk culture. The RBA, along with ASIC, will monitor the operational effectiveness of uplifts made to risk culture and the first two lines of accountability. CCP/SSF 3 All ASX completed the rollout of controls testing. ASX engaged an external consultant to review its action plan for uplifting risk culture.

Cyber resilience. The RBA, working closely with ASIC, will review:

  • adjustments to the ASX Cyber Strategy
  • adjustments to ASX’s cyber security practices, including plans to address any actions identified through ASX’s review of alignment with domestic and international cyber resilience frameworks and maturity models
  • ASX’s analysis of technologies to support safe recovery of operations within two hours following an extreme cyber-attack.
CCP 16, SSF 14 All

During the assessment period, ASX verified the maturity of its cyber security arrangements and their alignment with two industry recognised cyber security standards through independent audits.

Based on the results of its cyber assurance and testing activities, as well as the developments in the threat landscape, ASX boards approved an updated cyber security strategy. The updated strategy is aligned with an internationally accepted cyber security framework.

ASX has also engaged with the government on industry-wide initiatives, analysing the potential impact of cyber threats and vulnerabilities on ASX’s environment and any implications for its security posture, response and recovery capabilities.

Special topics

The RBA will carry out a detailed review of the ASX CS facilities management of:

  • Segregation and Portability
  • Operational Risk (including ageing assets, vendor management, resource sufficiency and the ASX Group Support Agreement).

The RBA will also conduct a review of Tiered Participation Arrangements.
CCP 13
CCP 16, SSF 14
CCP 18, SSF 16
Both CCPs
All
All
These assessments were completed. See Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Other ongoing reviews progressing during 2024

Legal certainty of intragroup agreements.

  • The legal certainty of arrangements for ASX Limited to replenish ASX contributions to the CCPs’ default funds.
  • The ASX Group Support Agreement, covering aspects outside the scope of the 2018/19 special topic assessment of the CS facilities’ legal basis (covered as part of the special topic on Operational Risk).
CCP 1, 14
SSF 12
All ASX has taken steps to assure itself of the legal enforceability of intragroup agreements for ASX to provide operational services to the CS facilities and replenish ASX contributions to the CCPs’ default funds.
Margin. The RBA will continue engagement with ASX to review the processes and controls it uses to help ensure the reliability of its margin-related operations, as well as its backup procedures in the event of an outage affecting the systems it uses to calculate and collect margin. CCP 6 Both CCPs ASX has taken steps to strengthen margin operations resilience, including changes to timing of intra-day margin calls; increased use of overnight margin buffers; and commencing a review of the controls currently in place. ASX plans to continue this work throughout the next assessment period.